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Workmen's Compensation for Suicide After
Traumatic Injury
Paul Mitrovich*
S INCE THE INSTITUTION of the Workmen's Compensation Acts,
courts have recognized that in some instances compensation
statutes cover suicide. However, these situations are few, and
must meet a rigid set of tests before a court will award compen-
sation to the decedent's family or survivors.
The leading case followed by the majority of courts in the
United States was decided in Massachusetts in 1915.1 It involved
a foundry worker who was injured when hot lead splashed into
his eye. He was taken to the hospital for treatment, and while
there became so maddened by the pain that he leaped from a
window to his death. The court held the suicide compensable be-
cause the act had been committed in a fit of frenzy where de-
cedent had no control over his actions.
The decision in Sponatski was an aftermath of Daniels v.
New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co.,2 decided in
1903, which involved tort liability for inducing suicide. While
the court denied recovery to the plaintiff in Daniels, it went on
to say that if the acts of the wrongdoer caused the decedent to
commit suicide in a moment of insane, or uncontrollable frenzy,
the suicide act being involuntary could not serve as an independ-
ent, intervening cause and the defendant would be liable.3
Following the decision in these two cases, courts throughout
the United States have attempted to categorize and classify every
type of broken and anguished mind. They have held a case to
be compensable, or not compensable depending on whether the
employee killed himself through voluntary choice, or through a
delirious impulse, regardless of whether medical testimony
showed the decedent was insane at the time he took his life.
Confusion has been created because many jurisdictions
have promulgated their own rules and standards for applying
*Of Cleveland; a 1965 graduate of the Univ. of Toledo Law School.
1 In re Sponatski, 220 Mass. 526, 108 N. E. 466 (1915).
2 183 Mass. 393, 67 N. E. 424 (1903).
3 Ibid., at 426; and see, Note, 20 La. L. Rev. 791 (1960); Salsedo v. Palmer,
278 F. 92 (2d Cir. 1921); Cauverien v. DeMetz, 20 Misc. 2d 144, 188 N. Y. S.
2d 627 (1959).
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the Sponatski rule, basing their decisions, in different areas, on
the laws existing in the state at the time of the decision. Such
tests include "intentional infliction of self-injury," "proximate
cause," "voluntary willful choice," "chain of causation," "inde-
pendent and intervening factor." Where a state has no criterion
to apply, the courts have recourse to the old "arising out of em-
ployment" test. Although many courts agree that the Sponatski
rule is unnecessarily harsh, they feel bound by procedure, prece-
dent, and the ambiguous wording of state statutes. The courts
realize that the rule is not adequate, but in the absence of more
adequate tests they rarely deviate from the established pattern.
Regardless of the tests used by a jurisdiction, the general
pattern is that compensable cases are frequently marked by some
violent or eccentric method of self-destruction, while non-
compensable cases usually present a story of quiet but ulti-
mately unbearable agony leading to a solitary, undramatic
suicide.
4
Massachusetts has codified the Sponatski case into statute.5
It makes compensation available when ". . . due to the injury,
the employee was of such unsoundness of mind as to make him
irresponsible for his act of suicide." The statute requires the
same tests as in the M'Naghten rule, and as such has proven of
little value in liberalizing, or improving recovery for compen-
sation.
Minority View
The minority view takes a more liberal approach. New
York, Ohio, Florida, and Mississippi have rejected the theory of
the Sponatski case,6 but in rejection have not made it easier to
gain compensation. Rejection in these cases has only meant that
compensation for suicide has been precluded on other grounds,
or because of the application of other tests.
7
Even the English courts, who claim to apply the minority
view, are in almost the same state of confusion as is found in the
4 1 Larson, Law of Workmen's Compensation 510.17 (1965).
5 Mass. Ann. Laws, ch. 152, Sec. 26A (1965).
6 Delinousha v. National Biscuit Co., 248 N. Y. 93, 161 N. E. 431 (1928);
Burnett v. Industrial Commission, 93 N. E. 2d 41 (Ohio App. 1949); White-
head v. Keene Roofing Co., 43 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1949); Prentiss Truck &
Tractor Company v. Spencer, 228 Miss. 66, 87 So. 2d 272 (1956).
7 1 Larson, op. cit. supra n. 4, at 25-26.
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United States. 8 The English courts hold that if a compensable
injury results in insanity and the insanity leads to suicide, the
suicide cannot logically be an independent, intervening cause if
there is an otherwise unbroken chain of causation between in-
jury and death. However, the distinction enters in the court's
application of the intervening factors.
The minority view is generally referred to as the "chain of
causation" testY This is misleading because a literal causation
test based purely on antecedent causation would virtually result
in absolute liability to the employer for employee suicides.
The minority view is represented by the case of Wilder v.
Russell Library Co.,10 where a library employee suffered a nerv-
ous breakdown from overwork and anxiety produced by the de-
sire to do a good job, resulting in her committing suicide. There
were no traumatic injuries. The court applied the "uncontrol-
lable impulse" test and granted compensation for the suicide.
The Wilder case has never been overruled, and stood, until re-
cently, as the only case of its kind. This is so, not because of the
reasoning of the case, or the tests applied, but because of the
result reached.
Ohio follows the minority view, but does not strictly apply
the "chain of causation," or the "uncontrollable impulse" test.
Ohio has no specific statute which makes direct mention of sui-
cide, but provides in its self-infliction of injury statute:
Every employee, who is injured or who contracts an occu-
pational disease, and the dependents of each employee who
is killed, or dies as a result of an occupational disease con-
tracted in the course of employment, wherever such injury
has occurred or occupational disease has been contracted,
provided the same were not purposely 'self-inflicted,' is en-
titled to receive .... 11
The self-infliction test is applied by statute in Ohio, even
though the statutes also state:
... the revised code shall be liberally construed in favor of
the employees and dependents of deceased employees.
12
8 Marriott v. Maltby Main Colliery Co., 13 B. W. C. C. (Scot.) 353 (1920);
Graham v. Christie, 10 B. W. C. C. (Scot.) 486 (1916).
9 1 Larson, op. cit. supra n. 4, at 510.21. See, Lehman v. A. V. Winterer Co.,
136 N.W. 2d 649 (Minn., 1965),
10 107 Conn. 56, 139 A. 644 (1927).
11 Ohio Rev. Code Ann., § 4123.54 (1964).
12 Ibid., § 4123.95 (1964).
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Though the courts take the opposite view, it seems obvious
that the purpose of the self-infliction statute was to prevent
fraudulent claims and not to preclude compensation where the
evidence is uncontrovertible.
An employer can make suicide under the self-infliction
statutes a complete defense. 13 Statutes in forty-one states, the
Longshoreman's Act and the United States Employee's Compen-
sation Acts consider suicide a specific defense, either as suicide,
or infliction of intentional self-injury. The reasons presented are:
1. Suicide does not arise out of employment since the source
of harm is personal.
2. Suicide is a departure from the course of employment. 14
States making no specific reference to suicide or intentional
self-infliction by statute are: Connecticut, Illinois, Michigan,
Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Wyoming.
Whether a court applies the majority or the minority view,
states apply six basic tests, either singularly or in combination:
1. Proximate cause.
2. Voluntary and willful choice.
3. Independent intervening factors.
4. Intent to inflict self-injury.
5. Chain of causation.
6. Insane impulse.
Proximate Cause Test
To meet the test of proximate cause, there must be a phys-
ical injury which standing by itself would be compensable. The
injury must occur during an in-the-course-of-employment situ-
ation, and the suicide is then traced back to the original injury.
If there is no employment-connected injury to set in motion the
causal sequence leading to suicide, the suicide is a complete de-
fense to the employer to preclude recovery. For example where
an employee was seen running through the plant holding his
head in apparent pain, and was later found to have thrown him-
self out of a window, compensation was denied because no in-
dustrial injury could be found as the initial cause.15 In another
13 Wilder v. Russell Library Co., supra n. 10; 1 Larson, op. cit. supra n. 4,
at 510.15.
14 1 Larson, op. cit. supra n. 4, at 510.15.
15 Joseph v. United Kimono Co., 194 App. Div. 568, 185 N. Y. S. 700 (1921).
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case, where an employee impetuously drank a bottle of acid
during working hours, compensation was denied.16 Compensa-
tion was also denied where the claimant tried to blow himself
up for no apparent reason, 17 and where after getting dust in the
eye, and receiving first-aid, employee became insane and died
four months later.' s
The Voluntary Willful Choice Test
This test applies to cases where there follows, as a direct
result of an accident, a physical injury and insanity of such vio-
lence as to cause the victim to take his life through either an un-
controllable impulse or a delirium of frenzy lacking conscious
volition to produce death without knowledge of the physical con-
sequences of the act. If this test is met, there is an unbroken
causal connection between physical injury and death. However,
where the resulting insanity is such as to cause suicide through
a voluntary, willful choice determined by a moderately intelli-
gent mental power which knows the purpose and the physical
effect of a suicidal act, there is a new and independent agency
which breaks the chain of causation arising from the injury.
This is so even though choice is dominated and ruled by a dis-
ordered mind.19
In one case, a worker was undergoing treatment in a hos-
pital for acute melancholia caused by physical injuries he sus-
tained in an industrial accident. He subsequently leaped from
the hospital window to his death. The court held the claim com-
pensable. 20 However, no compensation was allowed where an
employee, suffering from unbearable pain following an accident,
after talking sensibly to neighbors, went into a cornfield and shot
himself.21 The court held the decedent appreciated the act
where he waited until the family had gone to Sunday School
before committing suicide.22 Where a decedent left a note show-
16 Shewczuk v. Contrexeville Mfg. Co., 53 R. I. 223, 165 A. 444 (1933).
17 Lopez v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 225 P. 2d 702 (Ariz. 1950).
18 Veloz v. Fidelity Union Casualty Co., 8 S. W. 2d 205 (Tex. Civ. App.
1928).
19 1 Larson, op. cit. supra n. 4.
20 Gasperin v. Consolidated Coal Co., 293 Pa. 589, 143 A. 187 (1928).
21 Kasman v. Hillman Coal & Coke Co., 149 Pa. Super. 263, 27 A. 2d 762
(1942).
22 Industrial Commission of Ohio v. Brubaker, 129 Ohio 617, 196 N. E. 409
(1935).
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ing a deliberate and reasoned decision that the suicide was the
best solution, the court held that to allow compensation there
must be actual insanity. 23 However, the court held compensable
a case where a decedent, who suffered from pain of phlebitis,
struck his daughter and then ran out and hanged himself.
24
The Independent Intervening Factor Test
The independent intervening factor test is another means by
which some courts consider a claim. Most cases in this area
follow the same facts pattern: a severe, or extremely painful,
or hopelessly incurable injury, followed by a deranged mental
state ranging from depression to violent lunacy, followed by
suicide. Almost all authorities appear to agree on the basic legal
question: was the act of suicide an intervening cause breaking
the chain of causation between the initial injury and death? The
only controversy involves the kind and degree of mental dis-
order which will lead the court to say that self-destruction was
not an independent intervening factor or cause.25 ". . . New, in-
dependent intervening cause must be one not produced by
wrongful act, or omission, but independent of it .... 26
The Chain of Causation Test
The chain of causation test is similar to the requirements
of the independent intervening factors test: where there is an
intervening cause, the chain of causation is broken and recovery
is precluded. The intervening cause issue need not turn on the
employee's knowledge that he is killing himself. If the first
cause produces the second cause,27 though indirectly, the second
cause cannot be said to be an independent cause.
Insane Impulse Test
Problems arise in the administration of the insane impulse
test because courts use different yardsticks to measure it. One
court may focus attention solely on facts revealing conscious
volition, while another may rely exclusively on evidence re-
23 Bevan v. Lancaster Steam Coal Collieries [1927] 20 B. W. C. C. 241.
24 McFarland v. Department of Labor and Industries, 188 Wash. 357, 62 P.
2d 714 (1936).
25 1 Larson, op. cit. supra n. 4, at 510.15.
26 Prosser, Law of Torts, 266-267, § 49 (2d ed. 1955).
27 1 Larson, op. cit. supra n. 4, at 510.22.
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lating to the extent of the delusion and awareness of the physical
consequences of the suicidal act. Sometimes the true reason for
the decision may be obscured by other considerations remote
from the standards. Under the test of the Sponatski case, which
applies here, there must be absence of willful intent at the mo-
ment of death. The dogmatic application of the test ignores and
precludes compensation where pain was so intense that the
claim of death becomes the sole concern and where in effect re-
sistance to the suicidal impulse is impossible.2
8
In Iowa where a worker had an on-the-job fall and a week
later took his life, expert testimony showed that the accident had
caused the mental derangement. However, compensation was
resisted on the ground that the injury was caused by the em-
ployee's intent to injure himself (Iowa has a self-infliction of
injury statute). The Iowa State Supreme Court affirmed and held
the claim compensable: "the widow had proved to the court that
the decedent was motivated by an uncontrollable impulse, or
was in a delirium of frenzy, without conscious volition to pro-
duce death." 29 In Blasczak v. Crown Cork and Seal Company,
3 0
the employee hanged himself four months after he lost his leg
in an industrial accident. The Pennsylvania rule relies on the
"uncontrollable insane impulse" test to defeat the statutory de-
fense of intentional self-infliction. Although the deceased ap-
peared to act normal on the date of his death, a psychiatrist
testified that he was "out of his mind," and compensation was
allowed. However, where the victim lost two fingers, later be-
came depressed and took his life, the court held that the dece-
dent was not deranged even though depressed. The contents of
a suicide note was not sufficient to show a deranged mind.3 1
The above are some of the tests courts use to determine
whether a suicide is compensable under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Statutes of their respective states. Whether a court
applies the majority rule, minority rule, or whether it uses
terms such as proximate cause or independent intervening fac-
tor makes little difference. In the final analysis all the tests
comprise the same basic requirements: the injury must arise
28 Note, 31 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 187 (1962).
29 Schofield v. White, 250 Iowa 571, 95 N. W. 2d 40 (1959).
30 193 Pa. Super. 422, 165 A. 2d 128 (1960).
31 Widdis v. Collingdale Millwork Co., 169 Pa. Super. 612, 84 A. 2d 259
(1951).
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out of the employment, and the suicide must arise out of the
injury, or at least directly from it. An examination of the de-
cisions indicates that the courts, regardless of tests, will allow
compensation for violent and tragic deaths. The courts' outlook
on calm deaths appears to be colored with the stigma which re-
gards suicide as being criminal.32
Here are some cases which illustrate the violent vs. the non-
violent views. In Kelly v. Sugarman,33 the decedent suffered
from aggravated, pre-existing osteo-arthritis, followed by pe-
riods of total and partial disability. To ease the severe pains the
decedent turned to drugs and drinking. While intoxicated, the
decedent locked himself in the basement of his dwelling and
stabbed himself in the neck with a knife. The court held the
suicide was compensable. In Karlen v. Department of Labor and
Industries,34 the victim suffered a hand injury which later led
to depression and finally confinement in an institution. The vic-
tim committed suicide by thrusting his head against the blade of
a power saw. The suicide was held compensable. Based on this
decision courts do not seem to place a time limit which specifies
when the suicide must take place, as long as it is violent.3 5 One
case allowed compensation for a suicide which took place eleven
years after the decedent had received a compensable injury to
his head.3 6 The decision relied solely on the finding of causal
relationships.
It is when death is non-violent that courts and administra-
tors can best apply the tests which deny compensation. The
favorite seems to be that the decedent realized what he was do-
ing, or knew the consequences of his act. Considering the facts
of the case, the court will decide as it did in Tetrault's Case,3 7
32 Zimmiski v. Lehigh Valley Coal Company, 200 Pa. Super. 524, 189 A. 2d
897 (1963); Suicide following a silicotic disability held not compensable.
Dissenting opinion likened majority's reasoning to the McNaghten rule in
criminal law. This probably stems from the concept of the Middle Ages
where in order for a person to be insane, the test was whether he was
foaming at the mouth. For a discussion of the history of treatment of men-
tal disease, see L. P. Thorpe and B. Katz, Psychology of Abnormal Be-
havior, Ch. 1 and 2 ( ---- ).
33 5 App. Div. 2d 1023, 173 N. Y. S. 2d 41 (1958).
34 41 Wash. 2d 301, 249 P. 2d 364 (1952).
35 Ibid; Sulfaro v. Pellegrino & Sons, 2 App. Div. 2d 426, 156 N. Y. S. 2d 411
(1956). In the Sulfaro case, suicide was committed two years after the
injury and derangement. But see (3 years later) Lehman v. A. V. Winterer
Co., 136 N.W. 2d 649 (Minn. 1965).
36 Falso v. National Wire & Protective Co., 17 App. Div. 667, 230 N. Y. S. 2d
164 (1962).
37 278 Mass. 447, 180 N. E. 231 (1932).
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that the party who committed suicide was not deranged, because
he waved and said "goodbye" before leaping from a bridge. The
reasoning of the court here is strange because it considered a
person who talked to others before dying sane enough to realize
the consequences of his act. Decedent talked to several people
before he leaped.
Another area of non-violent death cases which courts view
as not compensable are those which indicate planning before the
act. Traveling to Canada to commit suicide in a lonely hotel
room,3 8 or waiting until the family had gone to Sunday School,89
were held non-compensable because the victims realized the
consequences of their acts by formulating a plan as evidenced
by their actions. Suicide notes seem to be the ultimate to show
intent or knowledge of the consequences of the suicide act. 40
One who leaves a note is considered not to have a deranged
mind.4
1
Tests are particularly harsh when reviewed in the light of
the non-violent cases and the view that a person who leaves a
note has no valid reason for taking his life. 42 Courts and legis-
latures do not account for victims who, after sustaining an in-
jury, become demented, their minds twisted until suicide seems
to be the best solution to their plight. This view further fails
to recognize the role unbearable pain or despair play in breaking
down the rational mental process.43 Circumstances can place a
victim in such a mental state that death actually seems more
attractive than life. The decedent may not only have a conscious
desire to produce death, but an eager one as well.44 The classic
example is the victim who, after leaving work early, drove to a
lonely spot where he wrote a note saying: "have a good wife, &
child, just in pain," then shot himself in the head. 45
Based on tests applied by the courts and the precedent set
by previous cases, the general answer to a case of death by sui-
38 Barber v. Industrial Commission, 241 Wis. 462, 6 N. W. 2d 199 (1942).
39 Industrial Commission of Ohio v. Brubaker, supra n. 22.
40 Bevan v. Lancaster Steam Coal Collieries, supra n. 23.
41 Ibid.
42 Widdis v. Collingdale Millwork Co., supra n. 31.
4 1 Larson op. cit. supra n. 4, at 510.22.
44 Morgan, Physiological Psychology, 357 (1943); Menninger, Man Against
Himself, p. V (1957 ed.).
45 Harper v. Industrial Commission, 24 Ill. 2d 103, 180 N. E. 2d 480 (1962).
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cide is: non-compensable. However, the question must be asked:
is it fair to the decedent's family to say that compensation can-
not be had because of the uncontroverted evidence of volition
when in actuality the unbearable pain was caused by an incura-
ble injury? Certainly, here money damages cannot make the
victim whole.
The theory of Workmen's Compensation is to do away with
the concept of liability and negligence, but in so doing it is not,
or should not be, a means of protecting the premium rates of the
employer.
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